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Intergenerational governance
	 SASAKI	Dan
	 Governance,	despite	its	popularity	as	one	of	the	most	fashionable	contemporary	
keywords,	 is	 far	 from	being	defined	unanimously	and	unambiguously.	The	concept	
tends	 to	be	more	 frequented	 in	specific	contexts	 such	as	corporate	governance,	
than	 in	more	abstract	 general	 frameworks.	This	makes	 it	nontrivial	 to	 extract	
the	 transversal	conceptualisation	of	governance.	 It	does	seem,	however,	 that	 the	
following	basic	 features	 tend	 to	be	commonly	observed	whenever,	 in	whatever	
context,	governance	 is	discussed.	Firstly,	 it	 is	 typically	an	organisation	 involving	
multiple	 individuals	wherein	 governance	becomes	 the	 subject	 of	 substantive	
discussions.	According	to	the	standard	microeconomic	theory,	an	individual	decision	
maker	is	 identified	by	her/his	 idiosyncratic	preferences.	This	 inevitably	means	that	
conflicts	of	 interest	arise	whenever	multiple	 individuals	are	 to	engage	 in	collective	
decision	making.	In	other	words,	collective	decisions	are	made	possible	exclusively	
through	 interpersonal	utility	 comparability.	 Secondly,	 unlike	 typical	 collective	
optimisation	decisions	in	economic	theory,	governance	ofttimes	refers	to	a	problem	
wherein	 the	objective	 is	either	unknown	or	ambiguous.	Viewed	more	profoundly,	
collective	decision	making	commences	with	 the	 task	of	establishing	 the	objective	
function	per	se.
	 Whether	the	conflict	emerges	in	the	choice	of	the	collective	objective	or	in	the	
actual	action	decisions	after	having	agreed	upon	 the	objective,	our	conventional	
social	choice	methods	such	as	democracy	tend	to	suffer	two	common	shortfalls.
	 One	 is	 the	 inaccuracy	 in	aggregating	 the	preferences	of	 the	people,	possibly	
resulting	 in	a	social	decision	which	 fails	 to	optimise	 the	social	 total	surplus.	This	
can	arise	even	when	everyone	affected	by	the	social	decision	is	represented	in	the	
98
decision	making	procedure.
	 The	other	is	the	possible	misrepresentation	of	those	interest	groups	who	cannot,	
for	various	exogenous	reasons,	participate	 in	the	decision	process.	 In	other	words,	
even	when	collective	decisions	are	made	democratically	amongst	 those	who	 take	
part	 in	the	decision	process,	they	can	spill	externalities	toward	those	stake-holders	
who	are	not	decision	makers	themselves.
	 The	 former,	 the	 aggregation	problem,	 typically	 arises	when	democracy	 is	
ostensibly	equated	with	 the	simplistic	majority	rule	 (which	need	not	be	confined	
to	the	simple	majority	 —	a.k.a.	50	percent	 —	rule).	The	mechanical	 "one	person	
one	vote"	 scheme	 typically	abstracts	 the	order	of	perference,	 referred	 to	as	 the	
ordinal	utility	in	economic	theory,	away	from	the	strength	thereof,	referred	to	as	the	
cardinal	utility.	Such	a	scheme	can	achieve	aggregate	utility	maximisation	 if,	and	
only	if,	each	"pro"	vote	and	each	"con"	vote	are	equally	serious.	Otherwise,	on	those	
issues	which	affect	minority	groups	far	more	seriously	than	the	rest	of	the	polulation,	
the	majority	rule	can	be	stunningly	oppressive	against	the	aggregate	wellbeing	of	the	
society.	This	predicament	has	long	been	known	since	Nazi's	supposedly	democratic	
ascention	 to	power	 in	 the	1930s	Weimar	Republic	and	 the	subsequent	 (and	very	
much	consequent)	oppression	of	ethnic	and	religious	minorities.	For	a	large	majority	
of	voters	who	had	no	close	non-Aryan	 friends,	 the	 treatment	of	minorities	was	
not	an	 imminent	personal	concern,	which	was	why	many	such	voters	were	more	
attracted	 to	 the	 "socialist"	part	of	 the	NSDAP	 than	 repulsed	by	 the	 "nationalist"	
part.	Meanwhile,	 for	 the	minority	groups,	 the	 latter	was	 literally	 life-threatening	
and	 thus	much	more	disagreeable	 than	 the	possible	allure	of	 socialism,	 though	
their	 life-betting	votes	were	much	too	few.	And	it	was	nothing	but	 the	headcount,	
without	regard	to	the	seriousness	of	each	ballot,	that	was	the	sole	determinant	in	the	
"democratic"	arena.
	 What	alternative	scheme	could	possibly	account	 for	 the	seriousness	of	each	
ballot?	Presumably	 the	most	 familiar	 is	 the	bidding	system.	The	key	difference	 is	
that	conventional	voters	make	no	commitment	in	that	they	do	not	promise	to	pay	for	
whatever	the	result	of	the	decision	may	be,	whereas	bidders	prepare	to	pay	the	bid	
price	in	case	they	win	the	deal.	Whilst	one	might	spontaneously	frown	at	the	idea	of	
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price-tagging	the	civil	rights,	would	 it	actually	be	such	a	corrupt	system	to	 impose	
a	small	fee	to	vote?	Or,	to	securitise	a	certain	number	of	votes	to	trade	them	in	an	
open	market?	A	modest	voting	 fee	 just	enough	 to	deter	many	of	 those	 ignorant,	
uneducated,	 jobless	and	nearly	penniless	Weimar	Republicans	but	affordable	 for	
well-heeled	Jewish	intellectuals,	could	possibly	have	salvaged	the	human	race	from	
the	Third	Reich	and	World	War	II	altogether.	A	modern	Japanese	rule	of	thumb	tells	
that	a	rainy	day	of	election	favours	 the	Communist	Party,	 implying	that	more	rain	
on	a	 few	national	elections	 to	come	may	serve	as	a	divine	Kamikaze	providence	
to	prevent	 the	LDP	 (in	 spite	of	 the	Party	name,	 the	 Japanese	Lib	Dems	are	a	
downgraded	version	of	 the	Tories	without	Lords,	Sirs,	Dames,	and	MBEs)	 led	by	
Dishonest	Abe	from	launching	the	Fourth	Reich	and	World	War	III.
	 Viewed	 from	the	 flip	side,	voters'	participation	rates	are	not	always	 the	best	
quality	measure	for	elections,	in	the	sense	that	counting	more	of	less	serious	ballots	
might	even	contaminate	 the	otherwise	appropriate	aggregation	of	public	opinions.	
Depending	upon	the	policy	 issues	 in	question,	some	voters	are	more	 important	as	
stake-holders	than	the	remainder	of	the	electoral	body,	yet	counted	"one	person	one	
vote"	 in	 lieu	of	 "one	Reichsmark	stake	one	vote,"	 running	 the	risk	of	allowing	 the	
unimportant	majority	to	persecute	the	important	minority.
	 The	latter,	the	externality	issue,	can	also	be	encompassed	by	extrapolating	the	
above-mentioned	 insight.	 Important	stake-holders,	 in	 the	sense	of	 those	who	are	
seriously	affected	by	the	social	decision	in	question,	may	not	always	be	present	 in	
the	decision	making	process.	This	 is	 typically	 the	case	when	the	externalities	are	
intertemporal,	or	 intergenerational.	Generally,	any	 legislation	or	policy	decision	
takes	 effect	 toward	 the	 indefinite	 future,	 but	 not	 retroactively	 into	 the	 past.	
Whenever	 the	present	generation	decides	 to	 launch	a	policy	or	 to	ratify	a	 law,	 it	
inevitably	spills	externalities	to	future	generations.	These	externalities,	however,	are	
diﬃcult	 to	 internalise	because	 those	stake-holders	external	 to	 the	decision	making	
procedure	at	present	are	 the	 future	generations	who,	by	definition,	are	not	ready	
yet	 to	express	 their	preferences.	This	 implies	 that	almost	any	 legislation,	even	
if	 established	via	contemporary	democracy,	 inevitably	creates	 intergenerational	
externalities	which,	by	construction,	cannot	be	fully	 internalised,	resulting	in	over-	
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(resp.,	under-)	establishment	of	laws	and	policies	entailing	negative	(resp.,	positive)	
externalities	toward	the	future.	The	relevant	research	question	here	is	how,	through	
what	scheme,	we	can	possibly	minimise	these	intergenerational	externalities	or,	put	
alternatively,	maximise	their	internalisation.
	 A	prime	example	of	intergenerational	externalities	can	be	found	in	the	explosion	
of	public	debts	 in	 recent	Japan.	Politicians	who	propose	heavy	 taxation	 tend	 to	
be	unpopular	amongst	voters	 in	 the	present	generation,	 so	 that	 the	 supposedly	
democratic	congress	 leans	 in	 favour	of	debts	which	are	ultimately	equivalent	 to	
postponement	of	taxation	to	future	generations.	The	key	question	is	who	eventually	
bears	the	postponed	taxes	to	repay	the	debts,	in	other	words,	who	are	the	ultimate	
stake-holders	capable	of	 internalising	 the	externalities.	 It	 is	not	straightforward	to	
tell	predeterministically	how	long	the	said	postponement	lasts,	and	more	generally,	
to	 foretell	how	much	of	 the	 externalities	 is	 to	be	borne	by	which	generation.	
This	 implies	 that,	even	amongst	 those	who	participate	 in	 the	decision	making	at	
present,	 the	younger	ones	are	more	 important	 stake-holders	 than	 the	elder	ones	
in	 that	 they	have	 longer	remaining	 life	expectancies	which	proportionately	ensure	
their	opportunities	 to	 internalise	 the	 future	effects	of	 the	present	decisions.	 In	 the	
example	of	public	debts,	the	older	voters	are	likely	to	escape	the	postponed	taxation	
whilst	the	younger	voters	are	more	likely	to	bear	it	 in	due	time.	Therefore	if	these	
voters	are	allotted	with	ballots	proportional	 to	 their	 remaining	 lifetimes	reflecting	
their	expected	capabilities	to	internalise	the	effects	of	their	own	decisions,	it	might	
serve	 to	curtail	 the	uninhibitedly	 irresponsible	postponement	of	 taxation	and	 the	
consequent	explosion	of	public	debts.
	 Democratic	peace,	the	general	historical	fact	that	a	war	is	unlikely	to	break	out	
between	democratic	countries,	teaches	us	how	important	it	is	to	reflect	the	opinions	
of	stake-holders	on	 important	decisions	 including,	albeit	by	no	means	confined	to,	
national	security.	Only	a	small	minority	of	powerful	politicians	and	industrial	giants	
profit	 from	a	war,	at	 the	expense	of	millions	of	 lives.	Therefore,	 if	 the	decision	
making	procedure	 is	democratically	accurate	 in	 that	every	 stake-holder	 is	duly	
represented	according	to	 their	stakes,	 then	those	millions	whose	 lives	are	at	stake	
never	 fail	 to	vote	against	 the	war.	 In	addition,	 there	 is	also	an	 intergenerational	
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aspect:	 	 absolutely	 no	 country	would	 ever	 opt	 to	 fight	 a	war	 if	 the	military	
conscription	age	were	not	18	but,	say,	70.	This	is	not	because	70-year-olds	are	too	
weak	or	sedentary	or	sick	or	senile	to	fight;		surely	they	can	drive	and	shoot,	even	
better	than	18-year-olds	on	average,	and	yet	the	loss	of	70-year-old	lives	would	incur	
considerably	 less	damages	to	 the	national	economy	than	that	of	18-year-olds.	The	
only	key	factor	here	is	intertemporality,	in	that	conscription	at	age	70	will	eventually	
draft	everyone	presently	younger	who	therefore	holds	a	life-stake	to	object	thereto,	
whereas	conscription	at	age	18	will	no	 longer	draft	any	of	 the	present-generation	
voters.	Hence,	rich	old	warmongers	consume	young	prospective	lives.
	 In	ostensibly	democratic	countries	 today,	 the	highest	stake-holders,	underage	
children,	have	no	votes,	and	 the	voting	 rates	of	young	adults	who	are	 the	next	
highest	stake-holders	tend	to	be	low,	whilst	those	of	the	old,	retired	generation	are	
the	highest	even	though	their	stakes	are	the	least.	Given	this	mismatch,	neither	the	
debt	explosion	nor	the	rise	of	reactionary	militarism	is	a	surprise.	It	is	high	time	that	
we	should	seriously	reexamine	"one	person	one	vote"	and	more	broadly	the	concept	
of	democracy	altogether.
	 There	 remain	a	number	of	 related	 issues	calling	 for	extensive	discussions.	
Firstly,	who	should	be	eligible	 for	 the	status	of	 stake-holders?	For	 instance,	why	
is	environmental	protection	 important?	 Is	 it	because	animals	and	plants	 in	 their	
habitats	in	question	are	also	stake-holders,	or	is	it	simply	because	the	environment	
affects	 our	 indefinite	 future	 human	 generations?	And	why	Article	 13	 of	 the	
Constitution	of	Japan	provides	that	the	people	shall	be	respected	as	individuals	"to	
the	extent	that	it	does	not	interfere	with	the	public	welfare"?	Is	the	"public	welfare"	
equal	to	the	aggregate	utility	of	the	people	as	defined	in	economic	theory,	in	which	
case	should	it	not	suﬃce	that	the	people	be	respected,	full	stop?	Or	is	the	"public"	
an	entity	on	 its	own,	outside	of	 the	collective	utility	of	 the	people?	Secondly,	 is	
the	ultimate	purpose	of	governance	 found	 in	 the	optimal	allocation	of	 resources,	
its	eﬃciency	and	fairness,	 just	as	assumed	in	economic	theory?	Or	 is	 the	decision	
making	procedure	 itself,	 such	as	 "democracy"	and	 "participation,"	a	self-purpose?	
Thirdly	and	relatedly,	 is	governance	bound	with	any	pre-imposed	value	system?	If	
so,	can	it	ever	be	a	value-free	science?	College	admission	in	Japan	is	typically	done	
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by	written	exams	only,	and	terms	and	conditions	such	as	concessionary	tuitions	are	
solely	need-based,	whilst	elsewhere	in	the	world	it	is	not	uncommon	to	offer	merit-
based	terms	and	conditions,	which	can	be	viewed	as	pricing	the	admission.	Is	such	
pricing	 fair,	or	not?	Another	example	can	be	 found	 in	criminal	courts,	where	 the	
sentence	tends	to	reflect	the	crime	that	has	been	committed,	but	this	is	not	the	same	
as	what	economic	 theory	 teaches	us.	To	be	economically	 rational,	 the	 sentence	
should	reflect	 the	expected	damage	the	criminal	might	 incur	to	 the	future	society,	
not	what	has	already	been	done.	In	this	way,	however,	attempted	murder	may	need	
to	be	sentenced	longer	than	completed	murder,	because	the	victim	is	still	alive	and	
thus	might	be	threatened	again	by	the	same	perpetrator.	Would	that	be	fair,	though?	
Then,	 last	but	not	 least,	 is	 the	doctrine	 that	science	"should"	be	value-free,	value-
free?
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